Multi-oracle interactive protocols are an extension of the Goldwasser-Micali-Rackoff model, in which several infinitely powerful provers interact with a single resource-bounded verifier. In this paper we consider the language recognition power of such protocols and prove that a tinite state verifier can accept any recursively enumerable set both in the multi-prover submodel of Ben-or, Goldwasser, Kilian, and Wigderson, and in the noisy oracle submodei of Feige, Shamir, and Tennenholtz. Unlike Lipton's single prover construction, our simulation of arbitrary Turing machine computations uses only polynomial overhead and stops with probability 1 (whenever the Turing machine stops). By using the new tehniques, we show that computing the expected payoff of reasonable games of incomplete information is undecidable, thus solving a long-standing open problem posed by Reif. ii"
INTRODUCTION
The notion of interactive proofs, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [lo] (IP) and by Babai [l] (AM), was generalized to models with many provers in two different ways:
1. The multi-prover model (MIP model) of Ben-or, Goldwasser, Kilian, and Wigderson [3] . The proves cooperate with each other and either try to jointly help the verifier or to jointly mislead him.
2. The noisy oracle model (NO model) of Feige, Shamir, and Tennenholtz [8] . The provers oppose each other, with at least one prover trying to help the verifier and the others trying to mislead him.
In this paper we use the terms "oracle" and "prover" interchangeably.
We investigate the language recognition power of constant space probabilistic verifiers in multi-oracle models. The power of space-bounded verifiers in single prover models has been extensively studied. Condon and Ladner [S] and Condon [4] give a general setting for studying the power of log-space verifiers in single prover models and show the counter intuitive result that languages in exp-time can l We construct a protocol by which a finite state verifier simulates a Turing machine (and thus tests any recursively enumerable statement), both in the opposing provers model and in the collaborating provers model. If any prover cheats during the simulation, the verifier detects this with high probability. Furthermore, the simulation stops with probability 1, unless the simulated Turing machine itself does not stop. l We show a connection with game theory, concluding that computing the payoff of optimal probabilistic strategies for reasonable two player games of incomplete information is undecidable. This solves an open question raised by Reif [16] in 1979. l In the collaborating provers model, we show that a finite state verifier can verify in polynomial time any statement that a poly-time verifier can verify.
Recently Lipton [ 14, 6] constructed a protocol by which even a single prover can prove any r.e. statement to a finite state verifier, provided the soundness condition is relaxed to allow cheating provers to extend the execution of the protocol indefinitely. This implies an alternative proof to some of the results in this paper, and, in particular, the undecidability result for the opposing provers model. However, statements which require time t(n) on a Turing machine require time 22'(") in Lipton's protocol, making it impossible to use Lipton's protocol in order to derive our results on simultaneous time and space bounds.
THE FORMAL MODEL AND TERMINOL~CY
The verifier V is modeled as a probabilistic finite automaton (pfa). V has special send and receive states through which it communicates with the oracles. One pair of states is dedicated to each oracle, and V can send or receive only one character at a time. Thus V can communicate with each oracle in constant space, although it cannot remember the complete history of the communication. In contrast, each oracle may remember the complete history of its own communication with I', and use it in order to compute the next character it sends.
Randomness is incorporated into V by having the transitions of V depend not only on the state of its finite control and on the characters accessed by its read heads, but on the result of a flip of an unbiased coin as well.
The oracles may be either good or bad. Truthful oracles are modeled as computationally unbounded random interactive Turing machines. Cheating oracles are modeled as (possibly uncomputable) functions from the history of their communication with V to the next character they produce. V does not know a priori which are the good oracles and which are the bad ones.
A protocol is said to be synchronous if V's communications with the oracles occur at fixed points of time, with respect to some global clock. Otherwise, the protocol is said to be asynchronous. In asynchronous protocols, the oracles cannot derive any conclusions from the deay between successive attempts to access them. All the protocols we construct can be implemented in the synchronous model. The probability of success of a protocol is defined in a natural way over the random tosses of V' and of the good oracles. The random string consumed represents a real number in the range [0, 11. Thus our probability space (Sz, F, P) is the following: 52 = [0, 11, F is the Bore1 a-field, P is the Lebesgue measure. Bad oracles do not toss coins. Instead they nondeterministically choose the function which gives them the best chance of cheating.
If only one of the oracles is present, we have the IP model of GMR [lo] with space bounded verifiers. We denote this model as IP ( 1 ) , where the 1 stands for one prover. We are interested in cases where at least two oracles are present. We distinguish between two submodels: 2. Noisy oracle (Feige, Shamir, and Tennenholtz [S] ). The oracles oppose each other in the sense that at least one of them is good, and the others may be bad. V does not know which is the good oracle. No oracle knows the communication of other oracles with V. We denote this model by (IP)(x), where x stands for opposing oracles.
We will in general consider cases where only two provers are present. It is a simple matter to adapt our protocols to cases where there are more than two oracles.
v's goal is to verify membership of the common input x of length n in the language L. Two conditions must hold:
1. Completeness. If x E L, the probability that I/ accepts is greater than $. (In the IP( (/ ) model this is required only if all oracles are good. In the IP(x) model, this is always required, as one oracle is always good.) 2 . Soundness. If x4 L, then no matter what the strategy of the bad oracles is, the probability that V rejects is greater than 3.
When we consider recursively enumerable languages, we have to allow for nonhalting computations. In this case (and only in this case), we use the following relaxed soundness condition: If x $ L, then no matter what the strategy of the bad oracles is, the probability that V accepts is smaller than 4.
SIMULATING A TURING MACHINE
When dealing with time-bounded verifiers, the role of the oracles is to actively help the verifier save computation time (by suggesting good options when a nondeterministic choice is required, by given counterexamples to wrong conjectures the verifier has, etc.). The key to understanding models with space bounded verifiers is to realize that the verifier's problem is not how to save time (which now he has plenty), but rather to provide him with space. In doing so, the oracles can assume a passive role of serving as work tapes. The verifier must be active in checking that the provers do their job correctly. Once storage s(n) is reliably implemented, the verifier can check the statements of space complexity s(n).
In this section we show how a finite state verifier can use two oracles as a reliable one-way infinite work tape. V asks the provers to store values for him and can later retrieve these values. The storage is reliable in the sense that when V retrieves a value from the tape, he can detect with high probability whether this value is the value V he initially wrote, or whether the oracles changed this value without authorization. Furthermore, in case some mishandling of storage is encountered, V knows to which of the oracles to attribute the fault. This is a necessary requirement in the opposing provers model, because in this case the provers contradict each other to begin with, and so the fact that someone (without knowing who) mishandles the storage does not really teach V anything new.
We note that the finite control of any Turing machine can be encoded in the description of the finite state verifier. The location of the read/write head on the work tape can be encoded as a special symbol in the appropriate location on the work tape itself and can be detected by scanning the nonblank portion of the work tape. Thus once V has an infinite work tape, he obtains the full power of a Turing machine.
Simple attempts to implement reliable storage fail. For example, V may try to store duplicate copies of each value, one with each prover. When V later retrieves the value, he checks that what the provers send match. This scheme offers V no advantages. In case of opposing provers, if a mismatch occurs, V does not know which one of the two provers cheated. In case of collaborating provers, nothing prevents them from deciding beforehand on a common policy of which values are to be changed and in what way. An equally naive scheme is to detect errors in retrieved values by using an error detecting code. This scheme would detect with high probability that an indifferent oracle returns a wrong value. But we are dealing with powerful cheaters which can easily create false values that pass the error detecting tests.
A storage policy which gives a partial solution to our problem is the following (adapted from Peterson and Reif [ 151): I/ keeps two copies of the infinite tape, one with P,, the other with P,. Any access to memory involves reading all contents of the tape from both provers and retrieving (or replacing in case of a write operation) the value which follows the special character used to designate the location of the read/write head. Before the protocol begins, V randomly and secretly chooses one of the following two policies:
1. Check that both provers are giving the same values as contents of memory by alternating turns between them.
2. Run P, one access to memory ahead of P,, again alternating turns between the provers. I/ checks that the contents of memory the provers send match, except for the last value which V wrote, which is updated with P, and not yet updated with Pz. (I/ always remembers in his finite memory what the last update was.)
In order to cheat successfully, the provers must both cheat at the same time. Otherwise V detects a mismatch. But in order to synchronize the first attempt to cheat, the provers must guess whether one prover is running one access to memory ahead of the other or not. They have probability 4 of guessing wrong.
The above idea has two drawbacks:
1. The protocol detects cheating, but gives no indication as to which one of the two provers is cheating. Thus, it is worthless in the opposing provers model.
2. The protocol is inherently asynchronous. If the provers have a synchronized clock, they can cheat. (E.g., start sending wrong values at noon.) THEOREM 3.1. Both in IP( I( ) and in IP(x), a probabilistic j?nite state uer$er can implement a one-way infinite work tape reliably.
Proof
In our construction V "signs" the contents of each cell on the work tape, so that a cheating oracle who tries to change the contents of a cell must produce a new "valid signature" as well. Cell contents are chained in order to prevent duplication or reordering of validly signed cells. In order to defy attempts by the infinitely powerful oracles to break the signature scheme, we make it secure in an information theoretic sense. This is achieved by dividing the signature between the two oracles, such that no single one of them has enough information in order to forge a signature.
Let 0 be the alphabet of the infinite tape to be implemented, where (T includes the blank character b and a special character h to be placed on the current location of the read/write head. Denote the contents of the one-way infinite work tape by m, , Each prover receives from V only some of the values, without seeing what the other prover receives. P, receives mi, ri, and si for all the odd i, P, receives them for all the even i. Thus P, holds m,, ri, si ; P2 holds m2, r2, s,; P, holds m3, r3, s3 etc, and V holds a, b, rO. The computation of a signature involves a and b which are secretly held by V, rid, which was chosen randomly by V and held by the other prover, and ri which is chosen randomly by V and held by the current prover.
In order to use his vurtual work tape, V scans its contents from left to right by asking the provers to send him each time the appropriate mi, ri, si values. V checks each time that the signatures are valid. If an invalid signature is detected, V declares the prover sending the signature as cheater. (Since ri-i was already verified against si-l, and since V himself supplies a and b, this implies that the received mi, ri, si are not the values that V originally sent to the prover.) Each time the contents of the work tape have to be updated, I/ chooses fresh values for all ri, including ro.
A formal description of v's algorithm follows. x +-% is used to denote that the value of x is randomly and uniformly selected as an integer in the range [0, q -11. j is a variable which accepts the values 1 or 2. Thus the operation j := 3 -j switches its value from 1 to 2 and vice versa. Recall that b denotes the blank symbol and h the read/write head. (c) si-In one-to-one correspondence with rip ,, which was chosen at random.
Thus neither P, nor P, know anything about a or b.
2. Assume that the first attempt to cheat involved cell i held by P,. Thus V gave P, the values mi, ri, and sj, and P, later sent V the values Mi, Ri, and Si, at least one of which is different from the original value. If the cheating is not caught, the following equation must hold:
Sj=a.Mi+b.Ri+r,_, (modq).
In addition we know that si=a.mi+b.ri+ri-, (modq).
Subtracting the two equations we obtain the following nontrivial relation between a and b:
(Si-si)=(Mi-mi).a+(Ri-ri).b (modq).
As q is prime, exactly q pairs (a, b) satisfy any nontrivial linear equation. But there are q2 possible pairs (a, b). So the probability that P, who is ignorant of the values of (a, b) will cheat and still pass the signature test is only l/q.
This completes the proof of the claim and the proof of the theorem follows. 1
Now that we know how to implement infinite work-tapes reliably, it is not difficult to prove the following theorem. THEOREM 3.2. Any r.e. language has both IP(x) interactive proofs and IP ( 1) ) interactive proofs where the verifier is a pfa.
Proof: Let L be an r.e. language and let T be the deterministic Turing machine accepting L. In order to verify that input x is in L, V simulates T's computation on x. T's finite control can be encoded into I'. By Theorem 3.1, using two provers V can implement work tapes with controllable probability of error (l/q). If no error is detected and V's simulation of T's computation leads to T accepting x, V accepts X. If an error is detected, then V declares the prover responsible for the error as cheater. In the IP(x) model, this leads to acceptance of the claim of the other prover. In the IP( (I ) model, this leads to rejection of both provers. 1
The converse of the above theorem is also true. Proof. Given input x, we want to know if I/ accepts x. If I' does accept x, there is some time threshold t by which V has accumulated probability greater than i of accepting x.
In IP(x) it is sufficient to guess the probabilistic Turing machine implementing the optimal good prover and to guess t. Now one has to try out all possible functions of how the bad prover replies to each possible history shorter than t and check that, for each one, the probability of V accepting, taken over the tosses of V and the good prover, is greater than 4.
In IP( 11 ) model, the optimal provers are deterministic. Thus it is sufficient to nondeterministically guess t and two functions of how each prover replies to each possible history shorter than t and to check over all sequences of v's coin tosses shorter than t that V has probability greater than f of accepting. 1
If the simulated Turing machine T does not halt on input x, then V does not halt on x either. This is unavoidable, because if V did halt and reject all inputs that T does not halt on, then techniques similar to those of the proof of Observation 3.3 would imply a recursive decision procedure for the hdting problem. But if T does halt on input X, it is desirable that V halt as well. With the protocols presented above, this is not the case. A cheating prover has small probability l/q of successfully diverting V's simulation to a nonhalting computation of T, and so V might not halt even though T does. It is possible to modify our protocol so that V halts with probability 1 on any input on which T halts. (This proof technique was independently discovered by Condon and Lipton [6] .) THEOREM 3.4. Any recursive language has both IP( (1 ) and IP(x) verification systems where the verfier is a pfa which stops with probability 1.
Proof: As in Theorem 3.2, the verifier simulates the computation of T. In order to stop, the verifier tosses a coin after each step he makes. If the coin comes up "heads," the verifier continues with the simulation. If the coin comes up "tails," the verifier aborts the current run and restarts the protocol from the beginning (with new random and independent a, b, and r,J.
With probability 1, any infinite sequence of coin tosses contains infinitely many long enough sequences of "heads" which can bring the protocol to its completion. If a prover tries to bring about an infinite computation, he must cheat every time this happens (otherwise V stops because T stops). The probability of not being caught in infinitely many independent attempts to cheat is 0. 1 Note that we pay a high price for stopping with probability 1:
1. The expected running time of the protocol is exponentially higher than the running time of T. 2. The original protocols could be implemented with a one-way probabilistic finite automaton. It was sufficient that the verifier go over the input tape just once and copy its contents to the virtual work tape. But now, when we need the possibility to restrat the protocol, the verifier must have a two-way read head on its input tape.
Both problems can be avoided in the opposing provers model. In this case, whenever the protocol exceeds the number of steps necessary to simulate T, the good prover can deliberately stop the protocol (and get blamed by V as a cheater). This is justified because the event that the protocol runs for too long without a lie being detected has small probability, which does not significantly lower the good prover's probability of winning.
GAMES OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION
In this section we describe an interesting application of our result on the power of IP(x) to game theory. This section does not deal with the IP( 11 ) model. ProoJ: The verifier's protocol uses random numbers in the range 0 to q -1. These numbers can be generated by asking each prover for a secret random number, and adding the two replies module q. Because at least one of the provers is good, the resulting number will be random, and the bad prover cannot know what its value is. 1 Our treatment of the verification system viewed the verifier as the active center of the system, and used provers only as memory. A complementary view is one in which the provers are two players actively playing a game, and the verifier is the passive "board" on which the game is played. The local state of the verifier serves as the position of the game. The messages the provers send serve as their moves. The transition table of the verifier as a deterministic finite automaton together with the contents of the input tape serve as the function computing the new position resulting from the previous position and the last move. The game is of imperfect information in the sense that the communication is secret, and the players (provers) cannot see the whole position (messages of the other prover). The game is "reasonable" in the sense that the size of the board (i.e., the memory of the verifier) does not change during the game. A strategy for a player is a (probabilistic) function from the observable history of a game to his next move. For exact definitions of the above terms see [17] .
In [16, 173 , Reif studies such reasonable games of incomplete information. He shows that determining whether one of the players has a strategy that always wins is complete for exp-exp-time. An open question raised in [16] is to determine the complexity of deciding whether a player's probability of winning with the optimal strategy is exactly $. There are many possible modifications to this problem. For example: Deciding whether the probability of winning is greater than $; deciding whether the probability of not losing is smaller than 4 (a player does not lose if either he wins or the game does not end); approximating the winning probability to within a fixed error; finding the best move in a given position; etc. The following corollary (with slight modifications) is robust enough to hold with respect to any of the above definitions. COROLLARY 4.2. The question whether player, has a probabilistic strategy which wins with probability > 4 in a reasonable game of imperfect information is undecidable.
Proof: As we saw in Theorem 3.2, for any r.e. language L one can build a system where V accepts x (player,, claiming x E L, wins with high probability) if and only if XE L. Thus determining whether player, has a strategy which is expected to win is equivalent to determining whether XE L. 1
SIMULTANEOUS SPACE AND TIME BOUNDS
In Section 3 we proved that a constant space (pfa) verifier can simulate a Turing machine. In this section we show how a constant space verifier can simulate another verifier which is not space bounded. Doing this may seem pointless, as a constant space verifier is as strong as a Turing machine, and an unbounded space verifier cannot be stronger. But the point is that when a Turing machine simulates an interactive proof, there is an exponential overhead in time, and so simulating an unbounded space verifier by a constant space verifier via a Turing machine is expensive. In this section we describe a direct simulation which has only polynomial overhead. This will allow us to transform results concerning poly-time verifiers to systems where the verifier has simultaneous poly-time and constant space bounds.
Consider a poly-time verifier VP,,,,,. It has an input tape, a polynomial size work tape, access to random bits, and access to two oracles. If we want to simulate V pOIY's computation using V which has only constant space, all we have to do is simulate the work tape. All the rest (input tape, random bits, and two oracles) V already has. In Theorem 3.1, we saw how a work tape can be simulated using two oracles. This simulation has only polynomial overhead (at most the square of the computation time). The problem is that in this simulation the oracles are aware of the contents of the work tape being simulated, and so they become aware of VpOlj's state. This implies that this simulation works only in cases where the original protocol run by VpOIY makes no use of secret randomness. COROLLARY 5.1. In IP(x), a pfa verifier can verifil any P-space language, and do so in polynomial time.
Proof. In [8 J a protocol is given by which a poly-time verifier can test any P-space assertion. In this protocol all communication is public, and V need not toss coins. By the discussion above, this protocol can be simulated by a constant space verifier in polynomial time. u A natural parallel to Corollary 5.1 is that in IP( I( ), a pfa verifier can accept in polynomial time any language in IP( 1 ). This can be proved through the equivalence of public coins and private coins for IP( I ) [ 111. But in fact, this result can be strenthened. Remark. In case an oracle is cheating, V rejects with high probability in polynomial time, but there is some small probability that V does not stop in polynomial time (or that V accepts incorrectly).
Proof. In [3] it is shown that a poly-time verifier with two provers can simulate a system with any number of provers. It is important to note that this simulation can be done by a synchronous verifier. That is, the exact points in time at which the verifier sends messages to the two provers are fixed before the protocol begins and do not depend on contents of messages from the provers, or on the verifier's secret coin tosses. So in order to prove Theorem 5.2, it remains to prove the following lemma. Proof: Consider a verification system with synchronous poly-time verifier V,. We lirst construct a new verifier V, which follows the same protocol as V,, but has only one work tape (see [12] ). Furthermore, with each access to the work tape V2 makes, we extend the nonblank portion of the tape one cell to the right, either as a natural consequence of 1/2's computation, or artificially with a "pseudo-blank" character. This is done in order to ensure that no information about V2's computation (other than the number of computation steps made) can be derived by knowing the length of the nonblank portion of V;s work tape. Next, we break each cell in Vz's work tape in two: An odd location and an even location. The value stored in the odd location is chosen at random, with uniform distribution over the values 0 to q -1, where each random choice is made independently. The value stored in the even location is computed so that the sum modulo q of the odd and even location gives the correct value of the cell. Thus, V, can still use his work tape, but anyone observing either only odd locations or only even locations on the work tape can learn nothing about VI's computation. Now we replace V2 by the pfa V and use the construction of Theorem 3.1 in order to simulate Vz's work tape. By this construction one oracle holds the contents of even locations on the work tape, and the other oracle holds the contents of the odd locations. V simulates VI's part in the protocol, and whenever Vz's protocol calls for addressing one of the oracles, V does so. The construction guarantees that the oracles cannot gain information about Vz's state in order to send I/ messages different from those that they would send V,. (This is where we used the fact that V, is synchronous. The fact that the oracles can count how many computation steps V makes up to the time they have to send a message does not teach them anything they did not know beforehand.) Thus V simulates Vi, except when cheating is detected (in which case V rejects the cheating oracle). 1 Using Lemma 5.3 and the discussion preceding it, this completes the proof of Theorem 5.2. 1 A recent result of Babai, Fortnow, and Lund [2] shows that nondeterministic exponential time languages can be verified by a polynomial time verifier in the collaborating provers model. Combining this with Theorem 5.2 we obtain: COROLLARY 5.4. In IP( 1) ), a constant space verifier can accept in polynomial time any nondeterministic exponential time language.
